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一些学者认为，我们赋予动物道德地位的依据也适用于人工智能，它们或许也有道德地位。因此，我们不应只顾让人工智能造福人类社会，还需考虑它们自身的利益和福祉。哲学家对于何种属性能够奠定道德地位多有分歧，在诸方案中，谢利·卡根基于广义能动性的道德地位等级论颇有前景。如果人工智能像动物一样拥有广义能动性，那么它们就能具备某种程度的道德地位。虽说这一方案成功论证了能动性可被视作识别道德地位的指示器，但是能动性与有意识的感知体验存在着共变关系，仅凭能动性无法将道德地位赋予人工智能。更重要的是，人工智能的本体论形态使之无法拥有像动物那样的能动性，因而无法享有道德地位。
Abstract：Some scholars argue that the basis on which we attribute moral status to animals can also be applied to artificial intelligence,implying that AI should possess moral status as well. Therefore,we should not only focus on leveraging AI to benefit human society but also consider their own interests and well-being. Philosophers have diverse views on which attributes can establish moral status. Among various proposals,Shelly Kagan's hierarchical theory of moral status based on a broad conception of agency is quite promising. If AI possesses agency like animals,it could have a certain degree of moral status. Although Kagan's framework successfully demonstrates that agency can serve as an indicator for identifying moral status,agency nevertheless co-varies with sentience. Thus,agency alone cannot confer moral status upon AI. More importantly,the ontological form of artificial intelligence prevents it from possessing agency akin to that of animals,thereby rendering it ineligible for moral status.
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(1)本文根据不同的语境将“sentience”译为“感知能力”“感知体验”或“感知”。这里笔者遵循了大多数动物伦理学家的用法,将感知(sentience)等同于有意识的体验。当然,不是所有人都采纳这种用法。比如,支持现象意识高阶理论的学者相信,意识依赖于高阶表征或高阶知觉,感知却不需要;也有学者认为,AI无法发展出感知能力,但可能会有情绪体验之类的意识。(cf.Ladak,pp.213-228)
(2)也有一些学者将“道德身份”与“道德地位”混同使用。(cf.Sher,pp.47-63)
(3)传统的道德地位理论总会面临一个难题:如何在保证所有人拥有平等的道德地位的同时,论证所有人的道德地位高于其他动物?基于广义能动性的“潜能+模态”模型,通过“双管齐下”的方式可以解决这个难题。尽管一个无脑儿缺乏长大成(正常)人的潜能,但他“原本可以”如此。他的“模态地位”弥补了这种潜能的缺失,以此提升他现有的道德地位。
(4)反对者也许会质疑,为何外星生物缺乏感知能力却能演化出国家、科技和文明。但思想实验只是一种“直觉泵”,目的是发掘隐藏的直觉,我们无须追究这个漏洞,且让思想实验继续下去。
基本信息:
中图分类号:TP18;B82-057
引用信息:
[1]王球.人工智能有道德地位吗?——基于谢利·卡根的广义能动性进路的考察[J].哲学研究,2026(02):113-125+176.
基金信息:
国家社会科学基金一般项目“当代心灵哲学中的动物认知问题研究”(编号20BZX026);国家社会科学基金重大项目“规范性哲学研究”(编号21&ZD049)资助