哲学研究

牟宗三认为，康德虽区分思辨理性与实践理性，却将自由意志归为“设准”,使道德实践缺乏本体论根基，其实践的形上学终未完成。他批判海德格尔的基本存有论仅关注人的有限性，忽视“超越者”,犯了“形上学误置”的错误，故其基本存有论亦未能真正完成。不过，海德格尔基本存有论的概念与理想是正确的。牟宗三通过论证人具有智的直觉，突破康德“实践理性之极限”,并证立“本心”(实有体)、“自由意志”(实有用)、“物自身”(实有果)三层实有，建立起真正的“实践的形上学”。在他看来，儒道佛三家形上学均为“实践的形上学”,但唯有儒家“道德的形上学”是积极义的，是真正的基本存有论，从而能够成为形上学的奠基。这一解释既符合牟宗三原义，也较以往研究更具新意。

Mou Zongsan argues that although Kant distinguished between speculative reason and practical reason,he relegated free will to the status of a postulate,thereby depriving moral practice of its ontological ground and leaving his practical metaphysics ultimately unfinished.Mou criticizes Heidegger's fundamental ontology for its focusing only on human finitude while neglecting the transcendent and in this way committing the error of metaphysical misplacement;thus,Heidegger's fundamental ontology also fails to be truly accomplished.Nevertheless,Heidegger's concept and ideal of fundamental ontology are correct.By demonstrating that humans are capable of intellectual intuition,Mou transcends the limit of Kant's practical reason and establishes three levels of reality:the original mind(substance-in-itself),the free will(function-in-itself),and the thing-initself(effect-in-itself),thereby constructing a genuine practical metaphysics.In Mou's view,the metaphysics of Confucianism,Daoism,and Buddhism are all practical metaphysics,but only the Confucian moral metaphysics has a positive sense and hence can serve as a true fundamental ontology and lay the ground of metaphysics.This interpretation both accords with Mou Zongsan's true meaning and offers a novelty beyond previous studies on this thought.