哲学研究

参考文献

古籍:《论语》。

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(1)“标准模式”一词来自斯考特·霍沃德(Scott Howard)关于情绪恰当性问题的研究(cf.Howard,pp.546-568),在中文文献中,费多益的相关研究是具有代表性的。(参见费多益,第110-117页)

(2)在下文中,笔者将“文献中对标准模式的主流刻画”简称为“标准模式”。因为本文并不反对标准模式,只是反对在它的解释中加入一个有争议的前提,而不预设该前提的、对标准模式的刻画是可接受的。

(3)有人可能会反对说,这里的语言描述似乎排除了自我指向性情绪(self-directed emotions),例如内疚(guilt)、羞愧(shame)等。然而,对于这类情绪,仍然存在发生的事件作为它们的意向性对象。对此,笔者的回应是,正文所说的“独立于主体存在”并不排除这类情绪,而是意在与以威廉姆·詹姆斯(William James)为代表的情绪理论相对立。詹姆斯认为,情绪不是对外在事件的反应,而是对身体变化的反应(cf.James,pp.188-205),但本文讨论的情绪理论反对这一点。同时,作为情绪对象的事件既可以是指向自我的,也可以是指向他者的。为了语言上的便捷,本文将仍然使用“独立于主体”来刻画情绪的意向性对象。

(4)其实,说符合“大多数人的直觉”这种表述并不太严谨,因为并不清楚这个“大多数”都包括哪些人。如果读者认为这个例子的说服力不够,不妨继续看看下面两个类似的例子。此外,为不道德的笑话感到好笑是否恰当这个问题要比这里论述的略微复杂。(cf.An and Chen,pp.374-396)

(5)根据达姆斯和杰克布森的观点,这些学者对“恰当性”的理解不同,但由于该问题不是他们讨论的重点,所以只在日常语言的层面上使用了这个概念。“恰当性”问题是在这些研究之后才逐渐成为一个核心论题的。

(6)这个论断也可以有其他方面的含义,例如,人们关于某物具有某种价值属性的判断就是人们关于该物所对应的情感反应是恰当的这一判断,换言之,人们关于该物所对应的情感反应是恰当的这一判断,构成了人们关于该物具有某种价值属性的判断。这个论断与正文所讨论的解释性命题是可以相互独立的。

(7)一些学者指出,休谟和斯密所使用的“sympathy”一词实际上更接近当代学者所使用的“empathy”。简言之,sympathy是包含了对他者的关切,这种关切并不一定通过共享情感的方式来获得。而empathy是共享他者的情感,并不一定包含关切。(cf.Darwall,pp.261-282)为了讨论简便,本文依循休谟和斯密的用法,仍然使用“sympathy”一词。

(8)关于价值新情感主义是否在理论上比传统及当代道德情感主义(或其对应的价值情感主义)更有优势这一点,限于篇幅,无法在此展开。不过可以指出,对于这个问题的讨论有关键的两点:第一,新情感主义是否能够对“恰当性”给出确切合理的说明,这是目前新情感主义内部争论的焦点。(相关讨论,cf.Rowland,pp.405-416;Schroeder,pp.25-55;Maguire;Gert,pp.1015-1542;Tappolet;Chappell,pp.684-704;D'Arms and Jacobson,2000a,pp.65-90;McHugh and Way,pp.575-606;Sharadin,pp.371-399)第二,情感主义是否能够对“不是所有情感反应都是恰当的,因而价值属性并不能够被情感反应所解释”这一批评给出合理的反驳。(关于可能回应,cf.Prinz,2007,pp.111-115)

(9)一个没有预设恰当性标准普适性的人同样也可以使用诸如“真正”“确实”这样的词,因此,正文列举这些语句并非意在决定性地显示达姆斯和杰克布森预设了普适性,这只是第一步。结合下文将要讨论的内容,此处所用语言预设的普适性是对他们论点最合理的阐释。

(10)杰西·普林茨(Jesse Prinz)的情绪知觉论可以被视为一个例外。普林茨提出了一种复杂的知觉身体论(perceptualist-somatic theory)。在该理论中,外部世界的事物引起身体变化,情绪只是对此种身体变化的知觉。与此同时,情绪并不表象身体变化,而是表象评价性属性。某种外部对象是否例示了相应的评价性属性取决于主体的“校准档案”(calibration file)。严格意义上讲,每个主体都可以发展出不同的校准档案,所以评价性属性的例示问题是相对于主体的。(cf.Prinz,2004,2007)因此,尽管普林茨也持有一种情绪知觉论,但他的理论并没有预设恰当性的普适性。

(11)“道德实在论”的标签在不同学者那里有不同用法。在一种用法中,道德实在论是说存在客观的道德事实(objective moral facts)。在这个意义上,道德相对主义并不必然反实在论,因为相对主义者也可以承认客观道德事实的存在。双方仅仅在“道德事实是否绝对或者普遍存在”这个问题上有分歧。换言之,道德实在论和道德相对主义都可以被划归为道德客观主义。在另一种用法中,道德实在论是指道德事实绝对或普遍存在。在这个意义上,道德相对主义是反实在论的。本文所讨论的实在论是指第二种用法。